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Producer Welfare Changes from Meat and Poultry Recalls
Rimma Shiptsova, Michael R Thomsen,  and H. L. Goodwin
The number and volume of meat and poultry recalls has  increased substantially in recent years.  This is likely due to
regulatory  emphasis on  foodborne  illness resulting  in an increased  frequency  of testing for pathogens.  We use  an
equilibrium-displacement model to examine the effects of recall costs on the beef, pork, and poultry industries. Results
suggest that higher recall costs may have actually increased producer surplus to the broiler industry because of consumer
substitution among products and that most losses resulting from recalls are accruing to the beef and pork industries.
Meat and poultry recalls  are initiated when prod-
ucts already in commerce  are found to pose threats
to public health. Thomsen and McKenzie argue that
the recall  mechanism  is  an important policy  tool
and that the role of the USDA Food Safety and In-
spection  Service  (FSIS)  in requesting  and  super-
vising recalls can help to align  private and social
incentives with respect to levels of  food safety pro-
vided by markets. As with any policy tool, changes
in the way it is used or implemented are an impor-
tant  consideration.  Using  stock  market  data,
Thomsen and McKenzie  (2001) found that the eq-
uity value  of firms  implicated  in recall  situations
fell. This suggests that recalls have an adverse  ef-
fect on current and  future profitability.  In this pa-
per we focus on profitability implications of recalls
at the industry  level rather than at the firm level.
Our main  objectives  are to  examine  the  overall
magnitude of changes  in recall costs and to deter-
mine the affects  of these costs  on the beef,  pork,
and poultry industries.
The number of meat and poultry recalls has in-
creased substantially in recent years. Between  1982
and  1997  there  were  on average just over 27  re-
calls per year carried out under the oversight of the
FSISI.  The  number of recalls  in  1998,  1999,  and
2000 were 44,62, and 76, respectively (USDA FSIS
2000b). The large increase in the number of recalls
'Meat  and poultry recalls are voluntary actions taken by
firms. In practice,  many recalls are initiated at the request of
FSIS.  Regardless  of whether the recall  occurs  on the firm's
own initiative or at the request of the agency, FSIS supervises
and monitors the recall  in progress.
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is likely due in part to two factors. One is the addi-
tional testing for foodborne pathogens that resulted
from transition  to  the mandatory  hazard  analysis
of critical  control point (HACCP) inspection  sys-
tem.  A  second factor  is  regulatory  response  to
highly publicized  contamination  incidents.  We
briefly discuss each of these in turn.
FSIS began to implement the HACCP inspec-
tion program  in January  of 19982  . This program
was  designed  to  improve the  safety of meat  and
poultry products by placing more emphasis on pre-
venting potential  hazards  at critical  points  in the
production process.  Along with HACCP came an
increased  emphasis on  testing and  zero-tolerance
limits for Listeria  in ready-to-eat meat and poultry
products and for E.coli 0157:H7 in  ground beef.
This may be one  factor explaining  an increase in
the number of recalls for contamination with these
pathogens.  Given the  perishable  nature  of meat
products,  some companies have made the decision
to ship products  before test  results  could be  ob-
tained,  which has  resulted  in  additional  recalls
(Brasher 2000).
The second factor is highly publicized contami-
nation incidents or outbreaks. One noteworthy case
involved  ground beef contaminated  with E.  Coli
0157:H7 processed at a Hudson Foods facility in
Columbus, Nebraska.  This recall involved 25 mil-
lion pounds of product,  at the time the largest re-
call on record. In the 12 months following  this re-
call there were more recalls (11  events) involving
E.  Coli 0157:H7  than during  the entire previous
10 years. The  second  case involved Listeria con-
2HACCP implementation  for all meat and poultry plants
employing  more than  500  persons  began January  26,  1998.
On the same date in  1999, plants with  11  to 499  employees
were added to the HACCP inspection list. Approximately 7,000
inspectors operating from 17 regional USDA-FSIS offices are
currently  dedicated  to  HACCP  implementation  and
enforcement.Journal  of Food Distribution  Research
tamination  at a Sara Lee plant in Zeeland,  Michi-
gan  in December  1998.  The incident  resulted  in
several fatalities  and numerous  illnesses.  Follow-
ing this incident, Listeria  recalls accounted for half
of all recalls in 1999  and for 46 percent of recalls
in 2000.
The purpose of this paper, though, is not to ex-
amine  changes  in the  regulatory  environment  or
trends  in recall activity  that might have  led to  an
increase  in the number and volume of meat prod-
ucts recalled in recent years. Rather, the study ex-
amines changes  in costs  due to a higher incidence
of recalls and the effects of these changes on prof-
itability and competitiveness  of the beef, pork, and
poultry industries. To do this, equilibrium displace-
ment  models  (EDM) are employed.  Within these
models,  a market equilibrium  is characterized  by
functions that are linear in supply and demand elas-
ticities.  This allows an examination  of changes  in
equilibrium  outcomes due to a  supply shock such
as  an  increase  in  expected  or actual  recall costs.
Such  models have  been  used  extensively  in the
analysis of agricultural and food policies (e.g., Sum-
mer  and  Wohlgenant  1985;  Beghin  and  Chang
1992; Brown 1995; Unnevehr, Gomez, and Garcia
1998).  An important  aspect of the  analysis  is  its
accounting  for substitution  effects between  poul-
try,  pork,  and beef products  when  examining  the
effects  of recall  costs.  Unnevehr,  Gomez,  and
Garcia (1998) demonstrated through their study on
HACCP regulations that  the effects  of regulation
on  industry profitability  differed  considerably
across industries.
Methods and Data
We begin with retail-demand equations that depend
on the retail  price  of the product  in question  and
the prices of substitute products.  We also  specify
general wholesale-supply equations that depend on
the wholesale price of the product in question  and
the costs of recalls3 .Note that an implicit assump-
tion is that substitution among products is not pos-
sible in supply. The equilibrium price at the retail
and wholesale  levels  differs by a marketing mar-
3The specification of structural equations at two different
levels  of the  vertical  chain  results  from the  specifics of the
meat industry.  Prices affecting  suppliers are  observed  at the
wholesale  level while prices  influencing  consumer behavior
are observed at retail.
gin,  which is assumed  to be constant.  Additional
assumptions made about the structural demand and
supply equations  are that they are continuous  and
differentiable.  The conditions that characterize  an
equilibrium  are
Q; = fi (W ,Ci)
(1)
Q.  =  -i  (Pbr,Pp,  Pb)
Qf  = Qi=  Q
i =b,br,p
where  b is beef,  br is  poultry, p is pork,  Wi  is  a
wholesale  price  for industry  I, P 1 is a retail price
for industry I, Qi is quantity produced by industry
I, and Ci is cost per unit produced for industry i.
After differentiating the supply and demand equa-
tions above and after some algebraic manipulation,
the  equilibrium  conditions  can be  represented  in
elasticity form as
d  ln(Q)  =  , (d In(Wi)-ci)
(2)
d  ln(Q  ) =  d ln(Pj  )
d ln(Wi  )=  idln(P.  )
i,j=b,br,p
where  z.,  and e.,  are the price transmission  elastic-
ity and own price supply elasticity,  for good i, re-
spectively; c. is a recall shock for good i; and 17i is
the demand elasticity for product i with respect to
productj.
The shock that disrupts an equilibrium in this
model is a change in the cost per unit, Ci from equa-
tion  1. The  elasticity formula is derived from the
differentiation  of equation  1 assuming  that  the
change  in cost per-unit  is due only to recall cost.
For this reason, recall costs enter equation 2 in much
the same manner as a tax. In equation 2, the shock
ci is recall  costs as  a percentage  of average  total
production  value by  industry  i. The  intuition be-
hind  this is that  in a competitive  environment,  a
change in the cost per unit produced is equal to the
change in marginal costs. Noting that average cost
equals marginal cost at a long-run competitive equi-
librium, it is legitimate to approximate c1 as the to-
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tal costs of recalls over wholesale value of the prod-
uct produced:
CiQi  Ci
(3)  c  =  =  -
WiQi  Wi
where  Qi is average quantity  produced by indus-
try i.
The  price  transmission  elasticity,  ;,  will be
used to derive wholesale-price percentage  change
from retail-price percentage change. We use an ap-
plication of Gardner's formula (1975) to calculate
a synthetic value of the elasticity of price transmis-
sion between wholesale to retail prices4:
o'i + e
(4)  i  =
o i + Si eb + (1-  Si )e
where a is elasticity of substitution  between meat
company and marketing inputs,  ea is elasticity of
supply of wholesale meat, eb is elasticity of supply
of marketing  inputs, and S is meat company  share
of retail dollar. To implement the model we assume
an elasticity of substitution of zero and an elastic-
ity of marketing  inputs of unity (Gardner  1975;
Richards and Patterson 1998).
The  total recall  costs  for an  industry  may be
conceptualized  in two ways.  The first is as actual
costs that occur when a product has been recalled.
These actual costs incorporate the value of the prod-
uct,  costs of product  recovery,  time off the shelf,
disposal, and sometimes incineration, depending on
a reason for recall. The actual annual costs for each
recall are estimated to be
Actual costs = 3*Retail  price of a product
*Pounds recalled.5
The second way to conceptualize recall costs is in
terms of expected costs or the costs that a firm ex-
pects to  incur  given  current  information  on total
industry recalls.  They are estimated as
4  Bernard and Willet (1996) argued that elasticity of price
transmission changes depending on shifts in retail food demand.
This  study focuses  on  average  price-transmission  elasticity;
therefore,  Gardner's formula is used.
5  Industry contacts were consulted to determine that three
times the retail value is a common estimate of recall costs.
(5)  EC/  =3 Pri/(R) * R
where ECj is expected  annual  costs of recall  for
plantj of industry I, Pr/  (R) is probability of recall
for plant j  of industry I, Ri is average  pounds re-
called  for industry I, and P. is retail price of prod-
uct i. Therefore total annual recall costs for the in-
dustry are
(6)
TCi = AC, + 3  Prj (R) * RJI
AC, =3PiR J
J
where AC is actual annual costs of recall and R. is
pounds recalled for plantj of industry i.
Data required  to  implement the model  (elas-
ticity estimates,  costs of recalls, retail and whole-
sale prices and quantities) were obtained as follows.
Required  elasticity  estimates  for beef,  pork,  and
poultry products were obtained  from earlier stud-
ies  that  have  analyzed meat-demand  systems
(Huang  1993) or report estimated supply elastici-
ties  (Sullivan, Wainio,  and Roningen  1990).  We
use two different estimates of demand elasticities:
wholesale-demand  elasticity  estimates  from
Sullivan, Wainio, and Roningen and retail-demand
elasticity estimates from Huang (1993) (Table  1).
The  required  information  on  the  costs  of re-
calls (supply shocks)  was obtained  from informa-
tion provided by FSIS  and multipliers used by the
food-industry  firms to estimate the direct costs of
recall events. The FSIS data are available from the
agency's website and cover the period from  1995
to  1999 and reflect  159 recalls of meat and poultry
products  (USDA FSIS  2000b).  Data reflecting
prices and quantities at retail and wholesale for beef,
pork, and poultry were obtained from USDA/ERS
Agricultural  Outlook publications.
A probit model is utilized to estimate probabil-
ity of recall Pi(R). We use an ad hoc specification
of the model with the primary aim of obtaining re-
call-probability  estimates for use later in the EDM
framework.  Variables included  are driven largely
by  data  availability  on  FSIS  inspected  plants
(USDA  FSIS 2000a).  The  explanatory  variables
reflect location, size of the plant, and a variable to
indicate whether or not the plant was under HACCP
inspection.
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Table  1. Demand and Supply Elasticity Estimates.





SWR,  7 1
b
Beef  -0.70  0.05  0.03
Pork  0.08  -0.86  0.03
Chicken  0.09  0.06  -0.56
Huang,  r7,c
Beef  -0.6088  0.1214  0.0207
Pork  0.2130  -0.7162  0.0167
Chicken  0.1054  0.0484  -0.3718
a e  is wholesale elasticity of supply
b  71, is wholesale  elasticity of demand
b  7r is retail elasticity of demand
d SWR refers to Sullivan, Wainio, and Roningen (1990)
Pri (R)  = ao + aSMALL  + a 2VSMALL  +
(7)  a 3 HACCP +  a4ORTH +  aSOUTH +
a 6 SMALL*SOUTH + a7VSMALL*SOUTH
where SMALL and VSMALL are binary variables
indicating small or very small plants and NORTH
and SOUTH are binary variables for location.  The
base category for this model was a large plant lo-
cated  in the West.  Explanatory variables LARGE
and  WEST  were  excluded  to  avoid  perfect
multicollinearity.  Likelihood-ratio  specification
tests supported the inclusion of the interaction terms
SMALL*SOUTH  and  VSMALL*SOUTH.  All
data required to implement the probit model esti-
mation are taken from the FSIS recall database and
the  FSIS data on  federally  inspected plants, both
available  through  the  agency's  website  (USDA
FSIS 2000a; USDA FSIS 2000b). Each data set pro-
vides an establishment  number which  allowed us
to match plants which experienced recall with the
size and location data.
Endogenous variables  of the EDM model  (2)
are the proportional changes in quantities and prices
of pork, beef, and chicken. The exogenous shocks
are changes  in prices received by the producer due
to additional costs. The change in producer surplus
for commodity  i is calculated as
(8)  APSi = WiQi  (d ln(Wi  )-  ci)
(l+d In(Q, )/2). 6
Results
The results for the probability model (7) are given
in Table  2 and the estimated probabilities  are pre-
sented  in Table  3. The results show that there has
been a substantial increase in the probability of re-
call  after HACCP  implementation,  especially for
small plants:  an average  of 98-  and  132-percent
probability increase for large and small plants, re-
spectively.  However,  these  results  should not be
misinterpreted.  As mentioned  in the introduction,
6 Consumer surplus  change is not calculated because the
study focuses  on industry surplus  changes only.Producer  Welfare Changes  from Meat and Poultry Recalls  29
Table 2. Probit Model  Parameter Estimates for Probability of Recall  [equation  (7)].
Parameter  Estimate  Standard  Chi-Square  Pr > ChiSq(l)
Error  Statistics
Intercept  -1.8957  0.1210  245.3000  <.0001
Small  -0.7722  0.1019  57.4300  <.0001
VSmall  -1.0562  0.1134  86.7600  <.0001
HACCP  0.3077  0.0722  18.1400  <.0001
North  0.1662  0.0865  3.6900  0.0549
South  -0.3757  0.1552  5.8600  0.0155
Small*South  0.5419  0.1606  11.3900  0.0007
VSmall*South  0.2612  0.2006  1.7000  0.1928
Table 3. Estimated Probabilities of Recall for U.S. Meat and Poultry Plants After HACCP Implemen-
tation.
Plant Size  South  North  West
Large plants
Before HACCP  0.011562  0.041857  0.029001
After HACCP  0.024783  0.077536  0.056143
Probability increase  (%)  114.35  85.24  93.59
Smnall plants
Before HACCP  0.00618  0.006179  0.003816
After HACCP  0.014117  0.014116  0.009132
Probability increase  (%)  128.43  128.45  139.31
Veiy snmallplantsa
Before HACCP  0.001083  0.002671  0.001579
a HACCP was introduced to very small plants in January of 2000; the recall data for that year were not available
when this study was conducted.
HACCP may have a positive effect on recalls due
to  increased  frequency  of inspections  and testing
and regulations specifying zero-tolerance limits for
pathogens.
The probability  estimates  from Table  3 were
utilized to calculate expected recall costs for each
plant.  To do this we grouped the FSIS recalls into
12  product  categories:  (1)  ground  beef,  (2)  other
beef products,  (3)  ham products,  (4)  other pork
products, (5) chicken products, (6) turkey products,
(7)  luncheon meats,  (8)  frankfurters,  (9)  sausage,
(10) other processed products, (11) baby foods, and
(12) miscellaneous.  Categories 6 through 12 do not
clearly  indicate  meat  contents  of the  product  in
terms of beef, pork, or poultry. Therefore, we cal-
culate both  an upper  and  a lower bound for total
pounds recalled for each  species. To calculate the
upper bound,  the sum of all categories  6 through
12  were  added to  the total  pounds of beef, pork,
and poultry products recalled.
Table 4 reports recall costs as a percentage of
industry sales. While recall costs typically account
for less than one percent of industry sales, this can
translate  into a large dollar figure. Data presented
in Table  5 show recall costs  reached hundreds  of
millions  of dollars  in  recent  years.  Note  that the
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Table 4. Total Production, Value,  and Recall Costs  as a Percentage of Industry Sales.
Industry  Year  Production  Industry sales  Retail value  % expected recall costs
(mln lbs)  (mln $)  (mln $)  Lower  Upper
limit  limit
Pork  1996  17,117  21,088.14  40,002.43  0.001  0.007
1997  17,274  21,264.29  42,321.30  0.009  0.055
1998  19,001  18,487.97  46,115.43  0.049  1.570
1999  19,308  19,114.92  46,628.82  0.011  1.291
Beef  1996  25,525  40,355.03  71,521.05  0.004  0.007
1997  25,490  40,325.18  71,244.55  0.540  0.567
1998  25,760  39,618.88  71,380.96  0.059  0.869
1999  26,943  46,234.19  77,541.95  0.026  0.656
Poultry  1996  31,802  19,752.44  45,336.75  0.004  0.008
1997  32,749  19,590.33  46,826.95  0.016  0.045
1998  33,143  20,865.90  48,107.03  0.022  0.828
1999  34,918  20,858.23  51,045.44  0.018  0.728
Table 5. Annual Losses  for the Poultry, Beef,  and Pork Industries.
Industry  Year  Actual Losses  Actual and Expected Losses
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large divergence in the upper and lower bounds for
pounds and recall costs in 1998 and 1999 is prima-
rily due  to large  recalls  for Listeria that affected
luncheon  meats  and  frankfurters.  Because  of an
inability to trace  back to a given  species, both  of
these recalls are included only in the upper-bound
estimates.
The results for producer welfare change come
from the different elasticity estimates employed in
the  analysis.  Price-transmission  elasticities  of 1,
1.17 and 1.25 for the pork, beef, and poultry indus-
tries,  respectively,  were  estimated  by utilizing
Gardner's formula  (4), assuming plausible values
for the  elasticity of supply of marketing  services
(1.00)  and the  elasticity of substitution  between
farm  and marketing  inputs  (0.0)  (Gardner  1975;
Richards and Patterson  1998).
The  results  for producer  welfare  changes  are
presented  in Table  6. Estimates are reported both
with and without substitution effects. By compar-
ing the two  sets of estimates one  can observe  the
importance of consumer behavior on the impact of
recalls to the various meat industries. Without sub-
stitution effects, higher own-price  elasticities  cor-
Table 6. Estimated Producer Welfare Losses  with Expected Costs  (in Million Dollars).
Industry  Year  Industry surplus  Industry surplus  Industry surplus  Industry surplus
change without  change without  change with  change with
substitution  substitution  substitution  substitution
effects  effects  effects  effects
(lower limit)  (upper limit)  (lower limit)  (upper limit)
Sullivan,  Wainio, and Roningen
Pork  1996  -0.15  -0.66  -0.16  -0.56
1997  -0.93  -5.41  2.85  -1.29
1998  -4.16  -133.71  -3.69  -125.91
1999  -1.01  -113.72  -0.85  -107.28
Beef  1996  -0.75  -1.44  -0.20  -0.56
1997  -112.72  -118.44  -55.53  -57.89
1998  -12.04  -178.29  -5.29  -69.40
1999  -6.29  -157.19  -2.93  -59.38
Poultry  1996  -0.38  -0.70  -0.12  -0.08
1997  -1.42  -4.04  5.60  5.21
1998  -2.11  -79.86  0.22  -10.04
1999  -1.78  -70.20  -0.36  -10.63
Huang
Pork  1996  -0.13  -0.60  -0.001  -0.443
1997  -0.84  -4.88  -0.001  -0.447
1998  -3.75  -120.73  -2.681  -102.599
1999  -0.92  -102.67  -0.363  -88.088
Beef  1996  -0.70  -1.34  -0.162  -0.146
1997  -105.15  -110.48  -0.162  -0.146
1998  -11.23  -166.31  -1.704  -1.109
1999  -5.86  -146.63  -1.202  0.472
Poultry  1996  -0.30  -0.55  0.121  0.261
1997  -1.12  -3.17  0.120  0.259
1998  -1.66  -62.81  1.690  37.207
1999  -1.40  -55.20  0.791  31.148
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respond  to higher producer welfare  losses. When
demand is inelastic, small decreases in quantity lead
to the large increases in price, thereby  offsetting a
large part of producer  losses. The results  indicate
that producer surplus change is always negative (net
loss)  when  there  is no  substitution effect  on the
demand side (cross-price elasticities are set to zero).
Without  substitution  effects,  producer  welfare
losses  range  from  approximately  $0.3  million to
$134 million  for the pork industry,  $1  million to
$178  million  for the beef industry,  and  $0.4  mil-
lion  to  $80  million  for the poultry  for both the
Sullivan, Wainio, and Roningen (1990) and Huang
(1993) elasticities of demand. Note that price-trans-
mission elasticities  are used only with the  Huang
elasticities because these are at the retail level, while
the Sullivan, Wainio, and Roningen (1990) demand
elasticities  are at  the wholesale  level.  The retail-
level elasticities are slightly lower in magnitude for
the own-price elasticities (see Table  1).
When  industry losses are computed with sub-
stitution effects,  the distribution  of losses among
the industries changes substantially and recall costs
can  sometimes translate  into welfare gains.  Most
notably,  depending  on which  elasticity  estimates
are used, the poultry industry appears to have been
a net beneficiary  as  consumers  substitute  poultry
for beef and pork. When no substitution occurs, the
total adjustment to shifts in supply  is reflected by
movement along the demand curve. When the sub-
stitution effect occurs, producer losses also depend
on the direction and magnitude of the demand shift.
The poultry and pork industries benefited from the
substitution  effects.  The gains  for the poultry  in-
dustry were as much as $37 million in 1998,  com-
pared to a loss of $63  million during the same year
when substitution effects are not considered. These
magnitudinal  differences  in losses with and with-
out substitutability again emphasize the importance
of consumer behavior on producer welfare losses.
Policy  Implications
The major contribution of the paper is a better un-
derstanding  of how the use of recalls  as  a policy
tool can impact competitiveness  among meat and
poultry industries. Results show that after HACCP
implementation  the probability of.a product recall
has  significantly increased for the pork, beef, and
poultry industries. This is most likely due to an in-
crease  in  the  rigor of testing  for  pathogens.  The
higher  incidence  of recalls,  however,  appears  to
have the largest impact in terms of producer wel-
fare  loss on the beef industry.  Given most of the
estimates of welfare change reported in this paper,
it appears that larger numbers of recalls have actu-
ally benefited  the broiler industry.
The importance of consumer behavior on pro-
ducer welfare changes as a result of recalls  is also
demonstrated.  A primary reason why the effects of
recalls are not constant across industries is that con-
sumers shift among the three commodities in reac-
tion to a price change. This can be advantageous to
some industries. Unfortunately,  the elasticity esti-
mates  are assumed  constant and also  do not cap-
ture consumer responses to a product recall. A bet-
ter understanding of consumer behavior would al-
low for more accurate estimation of producer wel-
fare changes.
Concluding Comments
Actual  consumer-health  benefits  are  difficult to
assess. Only in recent years has a large increase in
Table 7.  Rate" of Selected  Pathogens Detected  by FoodNetb  at the Five Original Sites,  by Year and
Pathogen,  1996-2000.
Pathogen  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Campylobacter  23.5  25.2  21.4  17.5  18.1
E.coli 0157  2.7  2.3  2.8  2.1  2.0
Salmonella  14.5  13.6  12.3  14.8  14.1
Salmonella Enteritidis  2.5  2.3  1.4  1.3  1.2
a Per 100,000  population
b Source: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5115a3.htm
32  July 2002Producer  Welfare Changes  from Meat and Poultry Recalls  33
the number and volume of meat and poultry recalls
occurred,  and  sufficient  statistics  have  not been
accumulated  to test whether a statistically signifi-
cant decrease in foodborne illness has occured.  The
FoodNet  of the  Centers for Disease  Control  and
Prevention collected data for selected counties in 5
states in  1996 and in  1997, and in 7 states in  1998
and  1999.  Therefore,  any difference  in the results
might occur as a result of different  samples.  De-
spite this limitation,  these data indicate that there
were no substantial overall changes in human health
in  1998  (see Table  7). Salmonella Enteritidis  de-
creased and rates of occurrence  of Campylobacter
declined  slightly in  1998/99.  However  it is diffi-
cult to attribute these declines to an increase in re-
calls.  The increase  in recalls has mostly reflected
problems with E. Coli and Listeria  rather than with
Salmonella or Campylobacter. In the case of Sal-
monella, the decline likely has more to do with egg-
quality-assurance programs than with pathogens on
meat. However,  incidences of human illness might
be negatively correlated with recalls because they
increase consumer awareness of hazards in the food
supply.
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